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Abstract: In the context of current agrarian reform efforts in South Africa, this paper analyses the 
livelihood trajectories of ‘emergent’ farmers in Eastern Cape Province. We apply a rural livelihoods 
framework to 60 emergent cattle farmers to understand the different capitals they have drawn upon 
in transitioning to their current class positions and associated vulnerability. The analysis shows that, 
for the majority of farmers, no real ‘transition’ from subsistence farming has occurred. However, they 
draw limited resilience from increased livestock holdings, continued reliance on social grants and 
connections with communal villages. A transition into small-scale commercial farming is apparent for 
a small number of farmers through the deployment of fnancial, human and social capitals. However, 
in following these trajectories, most of these farmers have been made more vulnerable to shocks 
and stresses than previously. We suggest that key to mitigating this vulnerability will be access to 
low-risk fnancial capital, more targeted support, and strategies to support farmers that might not 
transition from subsistence production. 
Keywords: livelihood strategies; agrarian reform policy; livelihood capitals; resilience; vulnerability 
1. Introduction 
Agrarian reform in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), remains subject 
to considerable debate by policy makers, academics and practitioners, regarding both 
its primary goal and how it should be achieved. On one hand, many scholars and land 
activists maintain that the main focus of agrarian reform should be on providing fair and 
equitable access to land for as many smallholder producers (peasant farmers) as possible to 
enable them to create secure and resilient livelihoods [1–6]. More recently, however, in the 
context of concerns about food and nutrition insecurity in SSA [7–9], agrarian reform ap-
proaches have become much more closely aligned with neo-liberal agendas focused on the 
commercialisation of smallholder agriculture and related approaches such as the provision 
of secure land rights through land titling [10,11]. Protagonists of these approaches argue 
strongly that food insecurity in Africa, and indeed SSA, can only effectively be addressed 
through a greater focus on commercial production linked to local and international mar-
kets [12,13]. Indeed, there is now evidence of this translating into policy and practice in 
southern Africa [14], and SSA more broadly [15,16]. However, commercialisation of small-
holder agriculture as a mechanism to effectively address rural poverty, improve livelihoods 
and food security in SSA remains heavily contested for a number of reasons [14–17]. 
Firstly, many scholars have suggested that a focus on transitioning smallholder farm-
ers into commercial agriculture, particularly where this is linked to provision of private 
farms, does little to improve livelihoods for the rural majority who are inevitably excluded 
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from land ownership [6,17–19]. Secondly, the ability of smallholder agriculture to be com-
mercially viable has also been questioned [20,21]. Smallholder farmers remain excluded 
from competitive markets due to poor yields, limited knowledge, lack of appropriate 
technology and inherent market risks due to ineffective institutional and market link-
ages [16,22]. Furthermore, in several countries within SSA, where attempts at broadscale 
commercialisation are already underway, the process has been criticised for doing relatively 
little to enable the required commercial transition to occur amongst the subsistence farmers 
it was designed to support. Instead, it has inadvertently created a spectrum of farmer 
classes with access to private farmland, among them smallholder subsistence farmers who 
have failed to make the commercial transition, medium-scale commercial farmers, and elite 
emergent black capitalist farmers, e.g., see [23,24] for South Africa; [25] for Zambia; [26] for 
Zimbabwe; and [15] for Kenya. This has only served to intensify the debate as to whether 
the commercialisation of smallholder agriculture in SSA can really achieve effective and 
inclusive food security [25]. 
South Africa provides an interesting case through which to examine efforts to realize 
this commercialisation. Here, agriculture and land holdings remain contentious and 
dualistic [27], a legacy of the colonial system [28]. Consequently, despite having the second 
largest economy in Africa, South Africa has the highest poverty inequality in the world, 
with some 10.5 million people surviving on less than USD 1.90 per day in 2017 [29]. The 
majority of these rural poor still rely on agriculture to underpin their livelihoods and are 
indicative of the link between poverty and agriculture identifed in many SSA countries 
(e.g., [30–33]). To help address this, the ambitious objectives of agrarian reform, in South 
Africa, have been to encourage smallholder farmers into commercial agriculture [34], 
reduce rural poverty and resolve the skewed colonial distribution of land [35] but the focus 
has changed at different stages of the reform process. 
Agrarian reform process in South Africa is based on a tri-component market-led 
approach consisting of land tenure reform, land restitution and land redistribution, a 
process which has been extensively reviewed (e.g., [27,34–37]). Initial efforts in 1994–1999, 
based on the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) model, focused primarily 
on the redistribution of private farms to enable historically disadvantaged poor people 
to secure access to land for their own production needs. Here, each benefciary received 
a ZAR 16,000 (USD 864) grant, and most benefciaries pooled these grants to purchase a 
farm as a group under the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ arrangements (the cost of land 
was estimated to be ZAR 900 (USD 48.6)/hectare [38] (ZAR is the South African Rand, 
converted at 0.054 to United States Dollars, the offcial exchange rate as at 15 April 2020). 
However, since 2000, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), 
and subsequent Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) models of reform placed much 
greater emphasis on production, which shifted the redistribution of farmland towards 
better-off black entrepreneurs [18,36], effectively shifting policy away from the broad-based 
‘accumulation from below’ approach aimed for under SLAG. LRAD offered larger grants 
and fnance schemes to black entrepreneurs to purchase land, in the process distributing 
land to fewer benefciaries on a freehold basis. PLAS, which followed LRAD in 2005, 
represented a further change in approach from freehold ownership, with land purchased 
at ‘market price’ by the government and distributed to benefciaries on a leasehold basis. 
Whilst this was ostensibly introduced to achieve more equitable land access, the lack of 
secure title to land remains a major challenge with the PLAS model [23]. Despite the 
shift in approach, these models of land distribution have both focused on the creation 
of medium-scale black capitalist farmers—so-called ‘emergent’ farmers—who are able 
to expand beyond petty commodity production into commercial production [2,3,24,28]. 
However, due to the relatively slow pace of land redistribution, weak post-resettlement 
support and the precarious livelihoods of many land reform recipients, as well as the 
opportunities it has afforded for elite capture, the achievements of the process remain 
contentious (e.g., [23,27,35,37,39]). 
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Moreover, there is now genuine concern that putting commercialisation at the centre 
of agrarian reform policy in South Africa, is exposing smallholder farmers to unfamiliar 
sets of shocks and stresses, which they have limited capacity to overcome, potentially 
undermining livelihoods. Often when confronted with shocks and stresses, smallhold-
ers attempt to diversify their livelihoods to buffer risk and reduce vulnerability [40,41]. 
However, these attempts at diversifcation have, in some cases, had counter-productive 
consequences. For example, small-scale farmers in some cases have demonstrated so-called 
‘illusive inclusion’ by receiving land from the state that they do not have the capacity to 
farm, and instead generating income by renting it out to commercial farmers [42] (p. 470). 
This raises important questions about the types of livelihood transformations smallholder 
farmers in South Africa are making in response to current agrarian reform policy and 
how sustainable these are. Several studies have identifed livelihood trajectories of small-
holder farmers in different contexts [43–46]. A particular focus in SSA [47–50], has been 
on understanding the livelihood dynamics of smallholder farmers after agrarian reform. 
However, there has been less focus on identifying the different livelihood assets that small-
holder farmers have drawn upon in shaping their livelihood trajectories and transition 
out of poverty. Understanding the processes through which smallholders have brought 
about these livelihood transitions, and whether as part of this they have become more 
or less vulnerable than previously, is fundamental in providing a grounded basis for im-
provements to both the policy and practice of land reform in South Africa. Within this, a 
greater theoretical analysis of these transitions from a class analytical perspective will be 
important both in terms of understanding processes of class formation (e.g., through accu-
mulation from below) associated with smallholder transitions in South Africa (e.g., [51]) 
and, specifcally, how this is refected in existing class typologies (e.g., [2]). More broadly, 
such analysis is also fundamental to shedding more light on key debates about how to 
transition smallholder farmers out of poverty and achieve greater food security within 
SSA [9,52]. The current narrative that access to land and agricultural commercialisation are 
key to poverty and food insecurity alleviation for smallholder households remains highly 
contentious [17,30,52,53] for a number of reasons. Firstly, linking poverty reduction to land 
and commercial production fails to understand the multi-stranded livelihood strategies 
adopted by many smallholder farmers to minimize risk [6]. For many smallholders in 
South Africa, agricultural production is primarily subsistence based, and underpins a 
livelihood strategy that might also involve waged employment, receipt of state benefts and 
small-scale non-agricultural business activities [41]. Access to more land, by smallholders 
does not therefore directly translate into greater desire to produce commercially but rather 
a desire for greater security through, for example, the larger number of livestock that can 
be supported to buffer livelihoods in times of need. Secondly, even where the desire to 
produce for sale is apparent in more entrepreneurial farmers, land provision in itself (by 
whatever means) is insuffcient to transition most smallholder farmers into commercial 
production. Such a transition has to be supported by access to markets and an ability 
not only to access the physical assets needed to produce but to also develop the required 
knowledge to produce for commercial sale [52,54]. 
This article seeks to understand the livelihood trajectories of emergent livestock 
farmers in South Africa, in relation to their transition from subsistence production to semi-
commercial or commercial production as part of agrarian reform. We focus on livestock 
farmers as much of the political focus in Eastern Cape (where the study was undertaken) 
has been on more effectively connecting livestock producers with formal commercial 
markets [55]. We seek to deepen this understanding by addressing three broad questions: 
(i) to what extent is a recognised transition being made by smallholder livestock farmers 
from one production strategy to another? (ii) how are they effecting these transitions in 
terms of the key livelihood capitals they are drawing on and how they are using them? 
(iii) do these transitions enable these farmers to become more resilient or make them more 
vulnerable to the shocks and stresses they currently face? 
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Study Site and Data Collection 
The study, carried out in 2017 and 2018, focused on 60 ‘emergent’ livestock farmers 
who, as part of agrarian reform, have been resettled on private farms surrounding the 
small town of Elliot (31◦3103000 S, 27◦8307000 E), in Eastern Cape Province (Figure 1). Elliot 
is 28.85 km2 in area, with an estimated population of 14,376 (2011 census) [56]. The farmers 
were selected from a broader cohort of 155 emergent farmers in the area, by purposive 
sampling [57] within four strata based on: (i) the land reform model they beneftted from 
(SLAG, LRAD or PLAS); (ii) the primary cooperative they belonged to (one of fve); (iii) 
whether they farmed individually or as part of a group; and (iv) farm characteristics, 
i.e., farm size and location. The farmers were settled on private farmland between 1995 
and 2010 from various surrounding communal villages and towns, e.g., Mthatha, Tsomo, 
Gxwalibomvu, Ncorha, Cofmvaba, Cala, Ngcobo and are mostly organised into livestock 
marketing cooperatives [24]. Data collection was through a semi-structured interview 
with each of the 60 farmers, which was framed around the key capitals they had access 
to before and after agrarian reform. This was augmented by information from focus 
group discussions held with groups of farmers from each of the fve primary cooperatives 
supporting the agrarian reform process (see [58]), interviews with key informants and use 
of secondary data sources, to provide a broader quantitative and qualitative understanding 
of the local socio-political situation and livestock dynamics. 
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2.2. Data Analysis 
We frame our livelihood analysis around an existing class analysis of 60 emergent 
farmers, whose main farming activity is livestock production. The criteria to categorise 
these farmers into these classes included livestock holding and marketed volumes, land 
holding size and accumulation strategy; and also drew on related typologies such as that 
of [2]. This is explained in more detail in an earlier article [24]. This identifed three 
broad classes of farmers: subsistence farmers on private land; small-scale commercial 
farmers; and fully commercialised farmers and we analyse the livelihood trajectories and 
strategies within each of these classes. Data were coded and analysed using NVivo release 
21.1 [59], through data indexing to identify emergent themes and understand factors that 
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shaped livelihood decisions and strategies. We use the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
(SLF) [60,61] to understand the livelihood trajectories of the emergent farmers within these 
three broad classes, primarily by identifying the different capitals they have drawn upon 
to facilitate their transition from one class position to another, and also whether they have 
become more resilient or vulnerable as a consequence. We further exemplify this through 
the use of selected cases. 
2.3. Theoretical Underpinnings 
A livelihood is conceptualised to be sustainable when it can maintain or enhance 
its capabilities in the context of socio-economic and ecological change, i.e., cope and re-
cover from shocks and stresses (the vulnerability complex) without depleting its natural 
resource base [60,61]. Consequently, livelihood resilience stems from coping with the vul-
nerability complex, which is largely dependent on the different combinations of livelihood 
capitals/assets and activities, i.e., the livelihood strategy [46,62]. Several authors defne 
resilience as the capacity of systems or actors to cope, adjust or bounce back from a shock 
or stress and maintain structure, function and identity in terms of buffer capacity (ability to 
absorb change), self-organisation (adaptive capacity) and learning capacity (modifcation 
or transformation) (e.g., [63–67]). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the concept 
of livelihood sustainability as captured within the SLF can be effectively linked to this 
conceptualisation of resilience [46,64,67]. Buffer capacity is framed by the livelihood capi-
tals or assets available; self-organisation is framed by the institutions and networks that 
determine how assets are accessed to adapt to the adversity; and learning capacity defnes 
the knowledge that underpins decisions on combinations of assets and activities arrived at 
in adapting to the vulnerability complex, i.e., the livelihood strategies. Self-organisation is 
defned as the norms, i.e., rules and values; social structure (top-down process); human 
agency (bottom-up process) and social networks that determine how livelihood capitals 
are accessed, either as individuals or as organised groups [64,67]. The SLF is therefore 
appropriate in terms of its ability to use the capitals to explain the transition process, 
understand the institutions and networks that determine which assets are accessed, and 
explain the strategic decisions that households make to cope with shocks/stresses and 
perceived risk to sustain livelihoods. We frame this understanding in Figure 2 below. 
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3. Results and Analysis 
3.1. Land-based Livelihoods before Accessing Private Farmland 
Prior to accessing private farmland between 1995 and 2010 as part of agrarian reform, 
the 60 emergent farmers included in this study were located in various communal villages 
and towns in the area, e.g., Mthatha, Tsomo, Gxwalibomvu, Ncorha, Cofmvaba, Cala, 
Ngcobo; with 85% of them having existing access to small fragmented land parcels of less 
than three hectares in size under usufruct or communal tenure. Based on the resources they 
had access to and their production strategies, two distinct groups were evident (Table 1) 
Firstly, a smaller group of nine smallholder farmers already producing surplus agricultural 
products and engaging with markets, akin to the ‘expanding commercial smallholders’ 
described by [2] (p. 5). Secondly, a larger group of 51 farmers who were subsistence-focused 
and produced little if any surplus for local markets. 
Table 1. Livelihood strategies pursued by the emergent farmers before land access in the Eastern Cape Province, South 
Africa. 
Expanding Commercial Smallholder Subsistence-Oriented Smallholder Farmers Component and Strategy Farmers (n = 9) (n = 51) 
Natural capital 
Access to large land holdings purchased or 
rented (up to 230 ha). Strategic conversion of 
fnancial capital into more land to engage in 
capitalist production. 
Access to small land holdings (up to 3 ha) and 
communal grazing. Usufruct tenure prevented 
them from accessing formal loans using land. 
Human/social capital 
Not formally organized into agricultural 
cooperatives, although fve were members of 
local unions. They were educated to tertiary 
level and all had market awareness. Family 
labour and employed extra labour to 
expand productivity. 
Not formally organized. 60% were educated to 
primary level and had limited agricultural 
knowledge/training. Family labour. Important 
family and cultural ties. 
Financial assets 
Income diversifcation. Relatively high 
agricultural income, average above ZAR 15,000 
(USD 810)/annum. Up to 10 animals sold per 
year, through access to external markets. 
Substantial non-farm income, e.g., from 
businesses. Loans raised through their 
business and/or private farms. Able to 
substitute/combine fnancial assets with 
other assets. 
Diversifed income: Low and irregular 
agricultural income, averaging ZAR 7200 (USD 
389)/annum. Up to 3 cattle sold/year, mainly 
to local markets. Agricultural income 
augmented by social grants, remittances and 
wage labour (up to 70%). Conversion of assets 
is limited. 
Productive assets 
Cash crops and larger herd sizes for marketing 
(mean 23, range 10–51 cattle). External inputs, 
e.g., dipping chemicals and infrastructure, e.g., 
vehicles to markets. 
Small herd sizes (mean 9, range 2–24 cattle; 
mean 17, range 9–30 sheep) and subsistence 
cropping for household consumption. Limited 
external inputs, vulnerability to drought and 
disease burden. 
3.2. Expanding Commercial Smallholder Farmers 
According to [2] (p. 5), expanding commercial smallholders are farmers who “ . . . 
already farm commercially on a small-scale, but are constrained by lack of land and other 
resources”. The nine expanding smallholder farmers in this study had access to more than 
three hectares of land prior to their engagement with land reform. Six of them achieved 
this by accessing additional land through local lease arrangements (average land holding 
15–20 ha) and three through having access to private-farms (farms were 67 ha, 142 ha 
and 230 ha in size) purchased between 1971 and 1995. The six farmers who leased land, 
did so primarily to engage in horticultural production, producing cash crops such as 
potatoes, carrots, spinach and cabbages for sale in local markets, along with maize for sale 
and livestock feed. Leased land enabled them to begin to engage in small-scale capitalist 
production, keep larger herds of cattle and sheep and access external markets. The three 
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farmers who owned family farms used their larger land holdings to begin to expand their 
small-scale capitalist production as a key part of their broader business interests. They kept 
larger numbers of livestock, produced cash crops such as potatoes and maize and regularly 
marketed up to 10 cattle/year and crops to spot markets and supermarkets. However, 
the larger part of their livelihoods was still supported by substantial non-farm income, 
mostly from non-agricultural businesses (e.g., funeral insurance, real estate, consultancy 
frms) they were running. Importantly, they were able to utilise their fnancial capital to 
buffer risk, for example by purchasing chemicals and vaccines against animal diseases, and 
to cross-subsidise between their agricultural and non-agricultural livelihood portfolios. 
They engaged with asset clustering and substitution [61,69] to enable accumulation and 
diversifcation of their livelihoods, as summarised in Table 1. 
3.3. Subsistence-Oriented Farmers 
The 51 farmers who had access to three hectares or less prior to land reform, engaged 
mainly in subsistence agriculture supplemented by income from petty commodity pro-
duction, waged labour and receipt of grants and remittances. Opportunities for them 
to expand their agricultural production within the communal system were limited. One 
farmer pointed out that: 
‘We were limited in the numbers of livestock we could produce because land for grazing 
was small, especially in winter the animals practically had nothing to graze. The grazing 
there is for everybody, and not just for you. So, having a lot of cattle was diffcult’. 
Most farmers coped with limited livelihood options, asset endowment and adversity 
through income diversifcation, particularly non-farm income. Due to the communal land 
tenure system, which does not provide legally secure access to land [70], farmers were 
unable to access formal loans against land-holdings to expand productivity. Consequently, 
almost half of the farmers relied on social grants as their main source of income. A further 
13 farmers gained some limited income from wage labour or remittances from employed 
family members. In total, 80% of farmers owned less than 20 cattle and sold no more 
than three cattle annually, a few sheep and occasionally wool. Cattle sales were limited to 
older cattle in response to a particular cash need and therefore cattle served as a capital 
‘sink’. However, when a cash need arose, cattle marketing was diffcult and limited to 
local markets, with a relatively low average selling price of ZAR 3000–4000 (USD 162–216), 
recorded between 1995 and 2000. This is similar to prices reported by [71] for the same 
region and period. The farmers also produced subsistence crops such as maize, potatoes 
and cabbage for home consumption. 
3.4. Emergent Farmer Livelihoods after Accessing Land 
After accessing land on freehold or leasehold through SLAG, LRAD or PLAS pro-
grammes described earlier, these two categories of farmers (nine expanding smallholder 
farmers and 51 subsistence smallholder farmers) transitioned into three broad categories 
(43 subsistence farmers on private land; 12 small-scale commercial farmers; and fve fully 
commercialised farmers) [24], as represented in Figure 3. The trajectories they followed as 
part of this transition are described below. 
3.5. Subsistence Farmers on Private Land 
This group, consisting of 43 farmers, accessed freehold land ranging in size from 10 
to 379 ha through either SLAG or LRAD, but demonstrated little or no transition from 
their original subsistence mode of production. This range included individually accessed 
smaller farms and larger farms collectively accessed as groups. Farmers who received land 
on a small group basis (four farmers in this case) eventually separated from one another 
leaving only a single family or smaller number of individuals on the farm, primarily due to 
challenges associated with production, beneft sharing, leadership conficts and poor post-
resettlement government support. Challenges with group dynamics have been extensively 
reported in previous studies of agrarian reform benefciaries [27,36,72,73]. Within this 
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group of subsistence farmers, two broad sub-groups were also apparent refecting varying 
degrees of engagement with the private farmland that they had acquired and associated 
levels of petty-commodity production. However, it should be noted that these sub-groups 
were not static but represent a dynamic continuum with farmers intermittently moving 
from one sub-group to another at different times, as indicated in Figure 3. 
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3.6. Hanging-In’ on Private Farms or Reversion to Subsistence Farming in Communal Areas 
The frst sub-group consisted of 32 ostensibly subsistence farmers. It included a smaller 
group of 12 farmers (seven men and fve women) who were unable to sustain themselves 
on the farms they were allocated and had returned to live in their communal areas, and 
a larger group of 20 farmers (16 men: 4 women) who had remained on their farms but 
were unable to move much beyond subsistence production. For the 12 who had effectively 
abandoned their farms and reverted to reliance on communal subsistence agricultural 
production augmented by social grants, wage labour or remittances, the only continuous 
connection they maintained with these farms was through the livestock they grazed there 
and a worker or relative left to take care of the animals. There was no livelihood trajectory 
or obvious transition from one form of production to another for either group. There are a 
number of potential reasons for this, which can be explained through their limited ability 
to draw on important sets of capitals when they were on these farms. 
Firstly, in terms of natural capital some farms were relatively small in size (mean 69 ha, 
range 10 to 250 ha for those who abandoned farms; mean 172 ha, range 98 to 250 ha for 
those who remained on the farms) and had limited grazing capacity to support livestock 
numbers at levels compatible with commercial agriculture. Most of the farms also lacked 
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key physical assets such as functional dams, forcing farmers to rely on seasonal streams and 
neighbouring farms with dams, to water their livestock. This meant that times of additional 
water stress associated with drought, severely affected these farmers and resulted in 
substantial livestock deaths. Most were without electricity or irrigation infrastructure, 
which meant that farmers relied on rain-fed agriculture and were further prone to climate 
vulnerabilities. They also lacked cattle handling and loading facilities; functional farm 
equipment and infrastructure, e.g., tractors, ploughs and bailers; boundary and internal 
camp fencing. Lack of fencing contributed to uncontrolled livestock breeding and stock-
theft. Critically, many of the farms were also diffcult to access, the dirt roads connecting 
them being dilapidated and effectively unusable during the wet season, and transport 
operators hired to market their animals charged them excessively as a consequence. These 
farms were an average of 42 km (range 25–68 km) from the main local market in Elliot and 
only fve of these farmers had their own vehicles to transport livestock. 
Secondly, fve out of the 12 abandoned farms also bordered communal areas, which 
was problematic because they experienced greater levels of stock-theft (see Case Study 1) 
and boundary confict with communal farmers, who frequently accessed parts of these 
farms for grazing prior to them being redistributed. This meant that it was not only diffcult 
for them to hold onto their land and livestock but also, given their dislocation from their 
own communal areas, to forge new social networks with the communal farmers they were 
in confict with. This limited their social capital, which was further weakened by a lack 
of support from their respective cooperatives and extension services. Collectively, these 
farmers were organized under one of fve local cooperatives. However, these often failed 
to access many of the agrarian support programmes available from government or, where 
they did so, to disburse the benefts evenly to the farmers within them [58]. Indeed, of the 
32 farmers in this group, only one farmer had beneftted directly from the cooperative they 
were a member of, receiving 10 cattle from a livestock programme and some fencing. 
Thirdly, these farmers had very little prior understanding of commercial agriculture 
(limited human capital) and drew primarily on basic farming experience gained through 
communal production. Lastly, none of these farmers had the capacity to access formal 
fnancial capital or had insurance. A few accessed informal loans, but these were unpopular 
due to their very high interest rates. This prevented them from effectively investing in their 
farms to improve infrastructure or from engaging with mechanised crop production. 
Thus, these 32 farmers were limited in their attempts to expand their production 
base primarily by poor physical capital (on-farm infrastructure) and an inability to raise 
the fnancial capital necessary to address this. This was exacerbated, particularly for 
the 12 farmers who ended up returning to their communal areas, by a dislocation from 
the communal networks they could normally draw on for assistance and an inability to 
replace these with alternative, local production networks such as cooperatives or reciprocal 
relations with neighbouring farmers. Ultimately, the potential of all of these farmers to 
make any recognisable transition to commercial production has been compromised by their 
inability to absorb the level of change required, i.e., limited buffer capacity, particularly 
with regard to physical and human capital, and limited self-organisation due to an inability 
to engage with the appropriate networks and institutions they could draw upon. This is 
underlined by Case 1 below. 
Case 1—Farm abandonment: Farmer Celani originally had a small 0.9 ha garden plot in 
Verganoeg communal area, where she produced maize, potatoes and cabbage for home 
consumption and grazed six cross-bred cattle and 29 sheep on communal pasture. She 
sold one cow and two sheep and lost two cattle and four sheep to diseases and stock-
theft between 1999 and 2001. Her household relied primarily on wage labour and social 
grants for survival. In 2002, she individually accessed a 112 ha farm through LRAD with 
the goal of using it to generate income from livestock sales. The farm, which had no 
electricity, incomplete boundary fencing, no internal fencing and one dysfunctional dam, 
was 38 km from Elliot. She moved her animals to the farm in the hope of increasing 
livestock production but ran into many diffculties in doing so. As the partially-fenced 
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farm bordered the communal areas of Ngcobo, she lost a bull and fve sheep in the frst 
year due to stock-theft. Due to the felds being infested with invasive black wattle and 
lack of agricultural equipment, she could not produce food crops and relied instead on 
food produced in her former communal area. Despite problems with theft, she managed to 
expand the herd to eight cattle, but due to lack of feed during a period of drought, coupled 
with limited capacity to treat parasites, two young animals died. The farmer struggled to 
market cattle due primarily to a lack of transport and the virtually inaccessible road to the 
farm, and between 2007 and 2008, she sold just one cow for ZAR 7500 (USD 405) and four 
sheep at ZAR 1000 (USD 54) each, all in the communal areas of Ngcobo. The farmer was 
part of a cooperative, but was unable to beneft from any livestock programmes, equipment 
or training and received no visits from extension personnel. During this period farmer 
Celani continued to rely mainly on social grants for her livelihood. In 2008, the farmer 
gave up her attempts to farm commercially and relocated back to the communal area. The 
farmer now only makes use of the farm to rent out part of it to a neighbouring farmer. 
Despite any clear trajectory away from subsistence production, it can be argued that 
access to these farms has, nonetheless, improved the livelihood security of most of these 
farmers with the majority having been able to expand their livestock holdings or rent 
their farms out for cash income. Since accessing their farms these farmers have increased 
their mean cattle holdings from nine (see Table 1) to 25 (range 8–40) animals, and their 
sheep focks from an average of 17 to currently 58 (range 30–70) animals, which are used to 
generate cash income when the need arises. These livestock, predominantly indigenous 
breeds, are resilient to local diseases but unsuitable for the formal market, hence farmers 
sold only occasionally through the social networks they maintained within communal 
areas. This livelihood stream is supplemented by social grants and remittances. For those 
farmers who have remained on their farms, three sets of capitals appear to be important in 
achieving this. 
Firstly, these farmers have continued to rely on their social networks within former 
communal areas for access to cattle and sheep markets. Indeed, 18 of these farmers still 
retain livestock and undertake crop production in their former communal areas. Secondly, 
they have been able to diversify their productive assets. Their farms now effectively 
function as an extension of their former communal production systems, enabling them to 
increase their natural capital, i.e., livestock numbers, in most cases. Much of their focus 
has been on building up sheep numbers, as these are easier to sell to cover urgent cash 
needs, refecting their continuing reliance on livestock as a store of wealth. This also 
underlines their ability to adapt to relatively poor cattle markets through knowledge of 
market dynamics, exhibiting a capacity to learn. Thirdly, these farmers also demonstrate 
clear income diversifcation to mitigate risk. Although they continued to derive steady 
streams of income from social grants and remittances and occasional animal sales, seven 
farmers now augment this income with wool sales from their larger sheep herds. A further 
three farmers earn income from wage labour and ten occasionally lease out part of the farms, 
providing greater fnancial security. This underlines the ability of relatively poor farmers 
to draw on existing capitals to develop important multi-stranded livelihood strategies 
to ‘hang-in’ as they struggle to sustain precarious livelihoods (see [74,75] for Zimbabwe; 
and [76] for Kenya). These characteristics are summarised for this group and other farmer 
classes in Table 2. 
Land 2021, 10, 226 11 of 24 
Table 2. Resilience and vulnerability factors for emergent livestock farmers attempting to transition to commercial 
agriculture in the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa. 
Trajectory Assets they Drew on Vulnerability Factors Resilience Factors 
Hanging-in on private 
farms or reverting to 
communal areas 
Subsistence farmers 
on private land 
No signifcant change in assets Poor buffer capacity Use of resilient, they draw on beyond increase in (limited access to all asset indigenous breeds. Secure natural capital (access to average groups). Poor income from social grants. 60 ha farmland and associated self-organisation capacity Diversifed fnancial increase in livestock holdings). (inability to adapt from sources e.g., leased land. Maintain social, marketing and communal networks to Slightly increased production network linkages with unfamiliar production and livestock numbers former communal areas. market networks, poor (25 cattle, 58 sheep) Diversifed income sources (wool, support from provide greater security. leasing land and wage labour). cooperatives). Limited Networks with former Increased sheep marketing production knowledge. communal areas. (market knowledge). 
Petty commodity 
producers 
Increased natural (average 293 ha 
land) and productive (40–50 cattle; 
improved livestock breeds) capital. 
Have developed new (positions in 
cooperatives and accessing 
benefts) and retained former 
(communal) social and market 
networks. Greater human capital. 
Limited buffer capacity 
due to persistent physical 
(infrastructure), fnancial 
(loans, insurance) and 
market capital limitations. 
Some formal market 
access. Socio/political 
capital (cooperatives). 
Greater human capital. 
Income diversity (wool, 
leasing land). Continue to 
draw on social grants. 
Small-scale commercial producers 
Access to fnancial capital (loans, 
personal funds, formal markets). 
Expanded physical (average 416 
ha land) and productive (average 
133 cattle, 216 sheep) assets. Strong 
current (cooperative) and former 
(communal) socio-political 
linkages for most farmers. Strong 
human capital (market awareness, 
and production knowledge). 
High levels of fnancial 
indebtedness in some 
cases. Limited buffer 
capacity due to poor 
physical capital (e.g., 
irrigation to supplement 
livestock fodder) and 
market price volatility. 
Strong socio-political 
capital. Human capital 
(production process 
knowledge, hired labour). 
Balance risk between 
farms and 
communal areas. 
Extensive physical (491–1600 ha Access to capitals. 
Fully commercialised farmers farmland), human and productive capital. External fnancial capital, 
Market monopoly and 
market price volatility. 
Extensive socio-political 
networks. External 
strong socio-political linkages. businesses/capital. 
3.7. Petty Commodity Producers 
This group of 11 farmers (nine men and two women), demonstrated a clearer although 
sometimes intermittent transition from subsistence production in their livelihood strategy 
than the previous group, through more widespread engagement with petty commodity 
production. They generally had access to larger farms than the other group, averaging 
293 ha (ranging from 216 to 379 ha) in size. They also had more livestock with an average 
of 41 (range 40–50) mixed-breed cattle and up to 100 sheep, marketing an average of fve 
cattle and 20 sheep annually. Whilst they still relied heavily on selling sheep to cover 
urgent cash needs, they also now drew on additional capitals to the ones they previously 
relied on. The farms were located at an average distance of 25 kms (range of 10 to 34 kms) 
from the Elliot market and fve of the farmers owned their own vehicle, allowing them 
to market their cattle through both the formal and informal markets. Those who did not 
have their own vehicle, hired transport or marketed their animals through neighbouring 
farmers who did. 
This transition from subsistence production can be related to changes they brought 
about in two sets of capitals. Firstly, these farmers strengthened their social capital, retaining 
their links with communal areas but augmenting these with stronger networks within 
their respective cooperatives, particularly for those who became committee members. As 
such, three of these farmers received between 10 and 29 cattle from livestock programmes 
and fencing from DRDAR through their cooperatives. However, links to communal 
areas remained important for them, with four of the farmers still engaging in subsistence 
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livestock and crop production using land in their former communal villages and primarily 
using their farms to generate additional produce to sell—a clear indicator of progression 
towards petty commodity production. Secondly, several were able to expand their human 
capital, with four of the farmers receiving some form of training in more intensive livestock 
production and husbandry through their cooperative, and one had a formal education 
in agriculture. 
However, the challenges associated with physical capital on their farms outlined 
for the previous group, still persisted. Three of the farms lacked all essential physical 
assets and a further three, despite being connected to the electricity grid, were not utilising 
it because of high costs. More importantly, a lack of fnancial capital to enable them 
to invest in improving productive capital was a clear barrier to them moving beyond 
petty commodity production. Despite selling a larger number of animals relative to the 
subsistence farmers, this group still marketed irregularly, mostly in response to a cash 
need, hence a sizeable part of their income still remained social grants and remittances, 
with three also selling wool once annually. Three of the farmers also occasionally leased 
out part of their farms for extra income. None of the farmers had any form of insurance 
and two farmers had unsuccessfully applied for loans. The critical limitation insuffcient 
fnancial capital imposes in preventing these petty commodity producers from expanding 
their production is illustrated by Case 2: 
Case 2—Supplementing on-farm subsistence with increased livestock sales: Farmer Gundla 
previously owned 15 mixed breed cattle and 22 mixed-breed sheep in Ncorha communal 
area, with access to 3 ha of arable land. He engaged in maize and vegetable production 
using the local irrigation system and a hired tractor, which he sold locally to augment 
income from his pension and other social grants. The farmer sold one bull and two sheep in 
2001, before individually accessing a farm in 2002 through LRAD. The 369 ha farm, located 
only 15 km from Elliot, had electricity but the farmer could not afford the ZAR 12,000 (USD 
648) monthly bill. The farm had a partial external boundary fence and was partly divided 
into three paddocks. It had two functional dams and make-shift cattle handling facilities. 
The farmer had 48 cattle and 87 mixed-breed sheep. As with other committee members in 
their cooperative, the farmer had received 19 cattle through the AsgiSA livestock scheme 
and fencing from DRDAR. The farmer maintained 12 of the cattle at his former communal 
area, and utilised the communal shearing shed there for wool production. He produced 
rainfed maize on fve ha of the farm to supplement his animals, hiring a tractor from the 
neighbouring cooperative. The road to the farm was inaccessible during the wet season. 
The farmer owned an old truck he used to transport livestock for sale to local markets. 
The farmer sold several livestock during most years, particularly when a need arose. For 
example, he sold three cattle at ZAR 7900 (USD 427) each and 17 sheep at ZAR 1300 (USD 
70) each in the informal market, and one cow for ZAR 5800 (USD 313) into the formal 
market in 2016, in a once-off transaction to fnish constructing a house on the farm. The 
farmer had unsuccessfully applied for a bank loan. He recorded no extension visits in 
2016 and was not formally trained in agriculture. The farmer still relied primarily for his 
livelihood on social grants, as he only sold animals, particularly sheep, to cover urgent 
capital cash needs. When asked why he did not sell more livestock and begin to accumulate 
and produce beyond subsistence farming, the farmer said: 
“My cattle are of mixed breed, the local abattoir that has a ready market does not buy 
them at a good price, if at all. I do not want to change to these new breeds, they need more 
care and money, which I do not have. Most of the ones I got through AsgiSA died, and I 
am still paying for them. It is a risk.” 
3.8. Small-Scale Commercial Producers 
The analysis also identifed a group of 12 farmers where a clear livelihood trajectory 
from subsistence farming into small-scale commercial production was apparent, such that 
their livelihoods now depended primarily on sales of crops and livestock (Table 2). The 
farms accessed by these small-scale farmers averaged 416 ha (range 343–510 ha) in size and 
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were located at an average distance of 14 km (range of 8 to 21 km) from Elliot. To a lesser 
extent they were still subject to some of the same problems with physical infrastructure 
affecting the subsistence farmers, particularly with respect to fencing, electricity and dams, 
but these farmers had considerably larger mean livestock holdings of 133 (range 46–150) 
cattle and 216 (range 84–564) sheep. This was mainly facilitated by their greater ability 
to access fnancial capital. To maximise productivity, they also capitalised on former 
social networks, producing food crops (e.g., maize, potatoes and cabbages), livestock feed 
(e.g., lucerne and oats) and livestock in their former communal areas to spread risk, and 
developed new networks that enabled them to access physical infrastructure through 
their cooperatives [58]. They drew on these new social networks to help improve their 
understanding of market dynamics (human capital and capacity to learn), through which 
they refocused their on-farm activities towards sheep production and the production of 
specialised cattle breeds to market in the formal sector. 
For this ‘middle’ group of 12 farmers, two main starting points for their livelihood 
trajectories were apparent, involving eight farmers who transitioned from the original 51 
communal subsistence farmers and four farmers who transitioned from the nine expand-
ing commercial smallholders (Figure 2). These trajectories into small-scale commercial 
production were strongly shaped by two key assets: fnancial capital and socio-political 
capital, drawn upon to varying degrees. 
At one end of the spectrum were those farmers (three) who relied almost entirely on 
fnancial capital in the form of personal savings or acquired loans both to purchase their 
farms and subsequently invest in operating them. In some cases, these farmers were forced 
to purchase their farms after trying unsuccessfully to access them through LRAD. In others, 
the farmers only engaged with agrarian reform post-LRAD (after 2005), and not being keen 
on the PLAS leasehold approach (whereby government ultimately owns all improvements 
made to the farm by the leaseholder), opted instead to purchase their farms on the open 
market. All of these farmers also acquired additional fnancial loans to develop the physical 
infrastructure of the farm and invest in natural capital such as cattle and sheep. At least 
part of the reason for this was that they were insuffciently networked within their local 
cooperatives and could not draw on capital assets from these (i.e., could not effectively 
substitute social for fnancial capital). Instead, they could only make use of existing social 
networks in former communal areas, which could not provide the physical capital required 
for commercial farming. Moreover, by utilising such large amounts of their own fnancial 
capital or loans in this way these farmers had put themselves in a precarious fnancial 
situation, being vulnerable to risk from market failure and price volatility. They had to use 
the majority of their income from sales of crops (e.g., maize) and livestock to service their 
loans, which prevented them from reinvesting suffciently in their farms, making them 
more vulnerable in the process. This was illustrated by one farmer thus: 
“My pension was not enough, hence I took a loan to purchase the farm, which was valued 
at ZAR 900,000 (USD 48,600) at that time. I had to borrow more funds to start produc-
tion at the farm. I took a ZAR 100,000 (USD 5400) from NERPO (National Emergent 
Red Meat Producers Organization) to purchase 22 Bonsmara; the AST programme loan 
to purchase nine Drakensberger cattle; a vehicle loan from West Bank; a Land Bank loan 
to purchase a tractor; and a loan to clear the farm felds which were infested with black 
wattle trees. Repaying all of these loans is a real challenge.” 
Another group of four farmers was able to draw on a combination of both fnancial 
and social capital in making the transition to smallholder commercial farming. Two of these 
were subsistence farmers, who had to self-fnance the purchase of their farms, after failing 
to qualify for redistribution through LRAD. However, their very strong social capital, 
represented by the connections they had built within their local cooperatives and close 
ties they retained in former communal areas, enabled them to access additional resources, 
thereby partially substituting for the fnancial capital required to invest in the natural 
and physical on-farm assets (see Case 3). A further two farmers, already with a stronger, 
expanded commercial footing, were in the opposite situation of receiving their farms 
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through LRAD but then having to rely mainly on loans they could raise against their farms 
and fnancial capital from other businesses to invest in making them productive. 
Case 3—Moving from communal subsistence production to small-scale commercial pro-
duction: Farmer Ramotshe grew up farming on a 2.9 ha plot in Cofmvaba, owning 
14 cross-bred cattle and 32 Sheep. At 18 years of age, farmer Ramotshe found employment 
in Alberton, Johannesburg for 36 years. He utilised income from employment to buy sheep 
in the communal areas, and by 1995 when the farmer retired, he had accumulated 62 sheep. 
The farmer sold an average of two cattle and fve sheep annually in the communal area. 
The farmer wanted his own farm but unsuccessfully applied for an LRAD grant and bank 
loan to fund this, eventually using his own savings to purchase the farm, which has placed 
the farmer under considerable fnancial pressure: 
“One of the challenges is that the South African banks are not talking the language that 
we farmers understand. I banked with Bank X, but they had their technicalities and they 
eventually failed to fnance me to purchase the farm for ZAR 2 million (USD 108,000). 
Instead I took all my savings and bought the farm. Then I was left with no money to 
make the farm productive.” 
After accessing the farm, he increased his livestock holding to 62 cattle and 300 sheep. 
The farmer acquired 11 Bonsmara cattle from AsgiSA and nine Drakensberger cattle from 
AST livestock programmes. Farmer Ramotshe also demonstrated considerable initiative 
in forming a cooperative with farmers in his former communal area, through which he 
accessed three tractors (one from Eastern Cape Development Cooperation, and two from 
DRDAR). The farmer made use of these tractors to produce 120 tonnes of maize in 2016 
on his freehold farm. The farmer earns income from sheep and maize sales made through 
a shop operated in Ngcobo, through cattle sales in the formal and informal sector and 
through wool sales. In 2016 the farmer earned ZAR 108,000 (USD 5832) from agricultural 
sales, which he reinvested in a second-hand truck, internal fencing and repairing the 
road to the farm. The farm has three functional dams and two perennial rivers but lacks 
electricity and irrigation equipment to utilise these for crop production. The limited farm 
infrastructure was identifed by the farmer as an impediment to expanding production: 
“The challenge is that the farms we received require a lot of work for us to begin to make it. 
This means the money we make goes into acquiring infrastructure, instead of expanding 
production. We still have a long way to go to become commercial.” 
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum was a group of fve farmers who were able to 
rely to a considerable extent on their social capital to make their transition into smallholder 
commercial farming. In the frst instance, they were able to take advantage of either 
LRAD (three farmers) or PLAS (two farmers) to access their farms without fnancial cost. 
Interestingly, two of the farmers who accessed their farms through the LRAD process 
were already expanding commercial farmers with their own private farms and the other, 
although from a subsistence background, was well-networked politically underlining how 
LRAD was frequently taken advantage of by the more privileged. Subsequently, all these 
farmers were then able draw on their strong networks within cooperatives and/or in 
communal areas, to provide many of the physical assets required to run the farm. Case 
4 illustrates the range of opportunities that some farmers can avail themselves of if they 
are suffciently knowledgeable and networked. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise 
that the productive assets received through cooperatives were not always adequate to 
meet all of the requirements for engaging in commercial production, and so most farmers 
still had to draw on some additional fnancial capital to expand their productive capacity. 
Thus, there continued to be some degree of fnancial risk carried even by this group and an 
inability to completely substitute social for fnancial capital by any farmer. 
Case 4—Moving from expanded petty commodity production in communal areas to small-
scale commercial agriculture: Farmer Thangwe worked in an agricultural bank for 16 years, 
while farming on a 15 ha communal plot in Mthatha, 12 ha of which he rented from other 
local farmers. The farmer owned an old tractor that he used to produce crops for sale locally. 
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He also had 17 cattle and 30 sheep, selling about fve cattle and 10 sheep annually in the 
communal area. The farmer retired and utilised the networks developed through the bank 
to join Mthatha Farmers Union and later the provincial South African Farmers Union. The 
farmer engaged in petty trade in agricultural products and augmented household income 
through buying sheep locally and reselling them through links provided through union 
membership. He received a 510 ha LRAD farm in 2002, located 27 km from Elliot. The 
farmer became the chairperson of the cooperative his farm was part of, through which he 
accessed 30 cattle from AsgiSA and cattle handling facilities through DRDAR. The farmer 
increased livestock to 72 cattle, 164 sheep and 27 goats and utilised the cooperative tractor 
and equipment to produce maize and potatoes on 20 ha of the farm. The famer continued 
to produce irrigated horticultural crops at his homestead in Mthatha using a small water 
pump (purchased through pension funds) and supplies to local schools and markets. He 
also acquired a small loan through which improved sheep breeds were purchased for the 
farm (e.g., Dohne Merino and Dormer). However, due to water and fencing challenges, the 
Lucerne crop that the farmer had established to supplement the sheep failed, and most of 
the improved sheep breeds did not survive. The farmer now buys the specialised breeds in 
from commercial farms in Dordrecht for resale, coupled with his mixed-breed local sheep 
trade in Mthatha. The farmer said: 
“I want to improve my sheep breeds and production because I have noticed a 
market for sheep, I can make easier money. The major challenge with farming is 
liquidity, that is working capital when you need it. Sheep are easier to sell and 
get income quickly than cattle.” 
Very shrewdly, during his tenure as the Land Reform Committee chairperson, the farmer 
made use of his understanding of the system, to turn the farm into a co-operative involving 
his son and daughter as co-managers. On this basis, the farmer applied for a RADP grant 
in 2011 through which he accessed 16 cattle, 92 sheep, a tractor and implements, a vehicle 
and stock fence. Farmer Thangwe is now marketing 19 cattle and 35 sheep annually. 
Interestingly, the productive capacity (physical and natural assets) of all these small-
holder commercial farmers is quite similar regardless of whether they started out as 
subsistence or expanded smallholder producers. As a form of basic comparison, the aver-
age farm size of the eight farmers transitioning from a subsistence background was 423 ha 
and they owned an average of 102 cattle (range 46–136) and 197 sheep (range 103–368), 
whereas the four farmers from an expanding commercial context had an average farm 
size of 402 ha and owned an average of 141 cattle (range 72–150) and 284 sheep (range 
of 162–564). Likewise, their levels of human capital in terms of the range of commercial 
farming skills they deploy are also comparable. The only real difference is that this latter 
group have made a smaller transition in developing the skills (human capital) required to 
be a smallholder commercial farmer and their reliance on former networks in communal 
areas is also diminished. 
Thus, in terms of understanding the vulnerability of these farmers, the key issue does 
not seem to be the starting point from which they made their transition to smallholder 
commercial farming but rather the trajectory they have followed in realising it. Those 
who have had to exhaust personal reserves and/or accumulate debt to purchase farms 
and fnance production have made themselves more vulnerable to external threats and 
shocks. Indeed, the latter group are in the unfortunate position of having to market produce 
simply to meet repayments and effectively ‘standstill’ fnancially rather than being able to 
accumulate and reinvest more effectively in their farms. In contrast, those who have been 
more effectively able to deploy their social capital to offset their fnancial investment in 
their farms are better able to buffer vulnerability not only by drawing on different capitals 
but by improving their self-organisation through using networks to gain access to key 
physical and natural assets. 
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3.9. Fully Commercialised Farmers 
Although most of the fve farmers in this category had some previous involvement 
with commercial smallholder production, they are in the unusual position of deriving 
a larger proportion of their capital from non-agricultural businesses. Based on this, we 
suggest that they have not necessarily ‘emerged’ as part of the land reform process from 
one social class to another, but rather were existing entrepreneurs who have simply used 
commercial agriculture as an alternative means of investing their fnancial capital (see [24]). 
They have developed strong buffer capacity by converting their non-agricultural fnancial 
capital investments into relatively low-risk natural capital in the form of large farms of 
between 491 and 1600 ha. They have also used fnancial capital to invest in a wide range 
of physical assets, including farm equipment such as vehicles and machinery, as well as 
infrastructure such as buildings and fencing. Importantly, this greater ability to invest in 
physical infrastructure compared to smaller-scale farmers has enabled them to realise the 
full productive potential of their farms. These farmers had mean holdings of 157 cattle 
and 298 sheep and were able to sell large numbers of livestock at good prices as well as 
producing large amounts of crops both for livestock feed and external sale (e.g., maize), 
which the other farmers could not. The buffer capacity afforded by their substantial 
fnancial capital has also enabled them to absorb in the short term any fnancial losses 
they have accrued through trial and error on the farm, using non-farm income. This has 
given them time to improve their commercial production knowledge over the longer term, 
for example, by developing specialised knowledge of production using improved, high 
value breeds of cattle and sheep, e.g., two farmers were stud breeders of Bonsmara and 
Simmental cattle, and one farmer specialised in breeding Dormer sheep. These farmers also 
had very strong self-organisation capacity, being socio-politically connected both within 
and beyond the cooperatives they belonged to and thus, very well-positioned to access 
the many different productive assets being made available to emergent farmers through 
government support schemes. However, we suggest that in accessing multiple resources 
using their strong networks within cooperatives, these farmers demonstrate elite capture 
and are in effect denying access to these resources by other, perhaps more needy, farmers 
in the same cooperatives, potentially exacerbating their vulnerability. 
4. Discussion 
Our fndings demonstrate that agrarian reform benefciaries exist as part of a con-
tinuum of class differentiation and have followed a diversity of livelihood trajectories, 
drawing on different combinations of capitals, to achieve their current class positions. At 
the lower end of the continuum are a large number of farmers who demonstrate little or 
no trajectory from a subsistence livelihood to small-scale commercial production despite 
access to private land. Here limited class differentiation is evident, the majority continuing 
to pursue largely subsistence-based livelihoods either on or off land reform farms, but a 
smaller number are beginning to engage in limited petty commodity production. They lack 
access to most capitals and hence have limited buffer and self-organisation capacity [67]. 
However, there is clear evidence of a smaller ‘middle’ group of farmers who have employed 
a wide range of different livelihood strategies to transition from communal subsistence 
production into recognisable forms of small-scale commercial production. 
Given the recent emphasis within government policy in South Africa in making this 
transition, this analysis of how these transitions have been made, should provide a basis 
for understanding how best to support such farmers to be able to continue producing for 
commercial markets whilst buffering potentially increased levels of risk. Importantly, it 
will also enable broader refections on the potential for those who have not been able to 
make this transition to do so, and how best to support those who are unlikely to make this 
transition at all. 
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4.1. Enabling the Transition to Commercial Production 
The transition to commercial production amongst those farmers who have achieved 
it, has been broadly grounded in an accumulation strategy [46] or ‘stepping up’ [26,74,76]. 
Critical to this transition has been an ability to draw on combinations of fnancial and 
socio-political ‘connectedness’ at various stages to facilitate both the acquisition of their 
farm and the investment required to transition it into commercial production and then to 
complement this with the farming ‘know how’ (human capital) required to sustain this. 
Given the current focus of PLAS policy on farmers as tenants (rather than owners) of farms, 
there seems limited value in discussing the different ways in which farmers in our case 
study area took ownership of their farms under the previous LRAD framework. However, 
the examples do serve to underline that farm acquisition through LRAD was a very unclear 
process with little transparency in terms of why some farmers received farms from the 
state at little or no fnancial cost whereas others had to draw deeply on either savings 
or bank loans to achieve this. Thus, eliminating this lack of transparency is at least one 
achievement of PLAS, even if it creates a range of other issues associated with farmers now 
being tenants rather than farm owners [23]. 
Clearly, access to fnancial capital plays a critical role in the ability of farmers to transi-
tion into commercial production [77] and may become even more important in South Africa 
in the future as emergent farmers who do not wish to be subject to the tenancy constraints 
of PLAS attempt to purchase freehold farms. Indeed, of the 60 farmers in our study, only 
two had accessed their farms through PLAS, whereas the rest either accessed them through 
an LRAD grant or purchased their farms independently. The continuum evident in the 
agrarian reform benefciaries involved in this study, from subsistence production on private 
land to fully commercialised production refects an increasing ability to access fnancial 
capital. Indeed, even the majority of subsistence farmers who have remained on their farms 
have done so primarily by relying on existing (e.g., social grants) or new (e.g., leasing their 
land to others) streams of external fnancial capital to sustain on-farm livelihoods. This 
has been observed in other studies, e.g., [78] in Zimbabwe, [15] in Kenya. However, these 
small fnancial streams are insuffcient to fully engage with commercial production, hence 
a lack of fnancial capital remains a limiting factor to their transition. This resonates with 
research fndings across Africa [15,25,77–79]. However, the requirement to access fnancial 
capital in order to farm commercially has put many farmers in a precarious and vulnerable 
position, particularly those who borrowed large loans to purchase their farms as well to 
expand physical capital and production. The struggle with loans and indebtedness under 
agrarian reform has also been observed in Namibia [50] and Kenya [15]. 
Those emergent farmers who managed to strengthen their socio-political capital dur-
ing or after their transition to small-scale commercial farming, were able to improve their 
capacity to buffer against shocks and stresses by at least partially replacing fnancial cap-
ital with social capital to access labour as well as physical and natural capital, primarily 
through cooperatives. This also gave them greater capacity to self-organize [67] as a way 
to buffer risk. Therefore, the ability to forge new socio-political linkages, in this case within 
cooperatives, seems to be a key step in the transition to commercial production amongst 
smallholder farmers, certainly if individual fnancial risk is to be minimised [80,81]. Occu-
pying a position of power in the local cooperative hierarchy (e.g., being in the committee) 
determined the extent of resources accessed by several farmers. This was also determined 
to some extent by the cooperative that the farmers belonged to, with those belonging to 
cooperatives that had fairer resource distribution having a better chance of accessing re-
sources [58]. It was also apparent that most small-scale commercial farmers still maintained 
strong links with their communal areas to try and minimise the risks they are exposing 
themselves to. Linkages with their communal areas provide a source of labour they can 
draw on when required and an informal market for livestock. However, it is clear that 
resources accessed through these social networks were rarely adequate on their own to 
expand productive capital to commercial levels, and hence fnancial capital remains key in 
making the commercial transition for the majority of farmers. The study did identify a few 
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farmers (e.g., Case 4) who have made it into small-scale commercial farming with relatively 
little fnancial outlay, by using the social networks available to them both in the commercial 
and communal environments to access and operate their farms. However, these are a very 
small group, most of whom beneftted from the vagaries of land transfer under LRAD, so 
it is diffcult to view them as being entirely representative. 
Human capital, particularly know-how about commercial farming and knowledge of 
‘systems’, has also been key for many smallholder farmers in this transition. Many of the 
farmers who made the transition from subsistence into some form of commercial farming 
already had some background in petty commodity production in communal areas and 
brought these skills with them. Refs. [2,34,38,82] indicate that those already involved in 
communal petty commodity production are best positioned to expand their production 
through agrarian reform. However, most of them have subsequently acquired and utilised 
some form of agricultural education to improve these skills, described as ‘knowledge 
identifcation capability’ by [67] (p. 155), through a strong desire to learn. Agricultural 
knowledge was mostly acquired through short-courses and seminars organized by the 
cooperatives they were affliated with. They have also actively developed their social net-
works through interaction with other farmers (peer-to-peer learning) within cooperatives 
to improve their farming knowledge. Refs. [83,84] argue that informal social networks 
between farmers are important platforms for knowledge transfer and exchange, which 
have potential to facilitate access to resources and link farmers’ social capital to human and 
fnancial capital. This improved capacity to learn, instrumental in recognising threats and 
potential opportunities [67], is refected in the more effective response of farmers to market 
dynamics. Two very good examples of this can be drawn from this study. Firstly, diversif-
cation by some farmers of the livestock breeds they held to include both indigenous and 
improved breeds in order to maximise market opportunity. Secondly, a greater emphasis 
on sheep production as they provide more opportunity for realising quick income returns 
in local markets and also an opportunity for income diversifcation through wool sales. 
Across Africa, several studies have indicated that small ruminants are better positioned 
to support poor livelihoods due to parasite and disease tolerance [85,86] and ability to 
perform in arid, low input environments [86–88]. They are also easier to sell providing 
a more effective credit and insurance buffer and minimising fnancial risk compared to 
larger animals [85,89–91]. All of these factors help to buffer the risk associated with the 
very considerable step from petty commodity production within a communal farming 
system to small-scale commercial farming on a private farm. 
The importance of social, human and particularly fnancial capital combining to facili-
tate commercial production amongst these farmers is perhaps most clearly demonstrated 
by the small number of fully commercialised, entrepreneur or investor farmers [23,92–94]. 
Effective use of these capitals has allowed them to buffer risk and strengthen their capacity 
to learn, a process which has afforded them the fexibility to experiment and make mis-
takes whilst they are developing their farming knowledge without becoming as fnancially 
vulnerable as some of the smaller-scale farmers. Although they are not representative of a 
typical ‘emergent’ farmer, there are nonetheless key lessons in their approach that might be 
transferable to smaller scale farmers under appropriate circumstances. Indeed, given the 
ability of these elite farmers to access capital from other enterprises and their strong exter-
nal networks and knowledge of commercial production, it might be possible to encourage 
them to play more of a supportive than extractive role within cooperatives. Two possibil-
ities would be mentorship of smaller-scale emergent farmers and facilitating improved 
resource access within cooperatives by strengthening connections to government and third 
sector programmes of agricultural support. The importance of the latter has already been 
extensively discussed in [58]. It might also require a strengthening of their managerial 
capacity [95], enabling them to be downwardly accountable in disbursing resources. 
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4.2. Overcoming Barriers to Transitioning out of Subsistence Production 
With only their previous communal social networks to draw on, limited fnancial 
capital and knowledge of commercial farming, and limited natural and physical capital on 
their farms, it is unrealistic to expect that the majority of subsistence farmers on private 
land can transition to commercial farming in the short term or, indeed, wish to. Whilst their 
farms clearly provide an important asset that helps them to buffer risk, these limitations 
prevent the value embedded in the natural capital within their farms from being fully 
unlocked. Similar outcomes have been observed from agrarian reform activities in other 
parts of Africa, e.g., [75] in Zimbabwe and [15] in Kenya. Due to limitations in the capitals 
necessary to facilitate on-farm livelihoods these emergent farmers fail to accumulate, and 
instead rely on alternative off-farm fnancial capital [15], mainly in the form of social grants, 
remittances and renting out part of their land. For the majority of subsistence farmers in this 
study, using these alternative sources of income as the basis of their livelihoods, augmented 
by opportunistic livestock sales from their farms affords them some stability, certainly 
more so than attempting to rely primarily on livestock sales as their main source of income. 
Arguably such an approach can form the basis of a resilient livelihood strategy [46,75], and 
fnds parallels in the case of former farm labourers in Zimbabwe outlined by [49] (p. 18). 
However, it does little to support the productivist focus of agrarian reform strategies 
such as LRAD and PLAS or create the commercialised black smallholder class to realise 
this. As [52] argues, approaches that are aimed at fostering food security and increasing 
resilience are more appropriate for many smallholder farmers, rather than simultaneously 
aiming to improve their engagement with commercial production. 
Nonetheless, over the longer term there remains the potential for some of these 
farmers to begin the process of accumulation, and in so doing make the transition to petty 
commodity production if they are properly supported. Part of this will be supporting them 
to forge and draw on new socio-political capital and networks more effectively. This is 
clearly very diffcult where farms are located a long distance from markets, linked by poor 
access roads and border communal areas, making them prone to incursion and livestock 
theft. Arguably, dislocation from communal social networks and an inability to forge 
networks with new communities adjoining farms are critical barriers to achieving this and 
only encourage farm abandonment. Clearly, even within the current PLAS model there 
is a role here for government in addressing this as part of the resettlement process, by 
trying to ensure that more vulnerable farmers are allocated farms as close to their previous 
communities and as near to road networks as possible. There is also a role for local 
cooperatives in facilitating knowledge exchange between farmers, particularly in brokering 
mentoring relationships between these farmers and those with a greater commercial focus. 
It is also vital that local cooperatives work to ensure a more level playing feld amongst 
their membership, such that service delivery and assistance with physical and natural 
capital is also provided to more vulnerable farmers [58]. Critical to this will be fnding 
a way to address the problem of capture of resources by those farmers who are more 
commercially active. Furthermore, addressing the currently poor rate of engagement with 
funding programmes by cooperatives will also be key in improving their service delivery 
to farmers. For example, only eight percent of agricultural co-operatives were recorded as 
having accessed funding from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in 
2010 [96]. 
For the few subsistence farmers who are already engaging in petty commodity pro-
duction, it is equally important to identify the barriers to moving to greater levels of 
commercial production. Whilst the evidence in this study suggests that access to larger 
pieces of land through agrarian reform is an important factor in expanding livestock pro-
ductivity, persistent barriers to market entry mean livestock cannot be easily converted 
to other forms of assets to support livelihoods [74]. Limited physical and fnancial capital 
mean these farmers will continue to focus on hardy indigenous breeds, which are not 
suitable for the formal market. Poor market infrastructure and long distances to markets 
also inhibit marketing opportunities [79], important in supporting commercial production. 
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More broadly, refs. [52,97] argue that the economic, food security and poverty alleviation 
potential of redistributed farms cannot be predicted based only on access to land or its 
agroecological context suitability. Rather, achieving these depends on appropriate resourc-
ing and capacitation of farmers to improve agricultural productivity. As part of this, the 
emphasis for smallholder development should be on understanding the conditions that 
are necessary to achieve these goals, and whether they should be achieved simultaneously, 
or in succession. This underlines a clear need for investment in resources beyond just 
provision of land to support the transition of smallholder farmers to commercial agriculture 
and food secure outcomes [52,54]. Without these challenges being addressed, the potential 
to utilise the formal market will remain beyond the reach of most emergent farmers. 
Finally, it must also be acknowledged that some farmers simply may not want to 
take the next step to produce at a commercial level. The aptitude or willingness to engage 
with alternative production strategies is shaped by market incentives, risk mitigation and 
complex human and social capital factors such as knowledge, networking, community 
values and culture [22]. As [17] (p. 159) suggest, ‘research needs to understand local 
determinism: maybe not every smallholder will want to be a commercial farmer’. Emerging 
behavioural economic and decision science in micro-development studies argues that policy 
should put stronger emphasis on enabling conditions for smallholder farmers to shift their 
perspectives beyond a ‘smallholder-mentality’ and localized food security, rather than only 
focusing on technical aspects, to facilitate transition to commercial agriculture [54,98]. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Our analysis suggests that relatively few land reform benefciaries in this case study 
have made the transition to a recognisable form of commercial livestock production. Whilst 
this is not unexpected, it does raise important questions about if and how agrarian reform 
policy should be refocused to support not only those who have made the transition, but 
also those who are unlikely to demonstrate any signifcant transition out of subsistence 
production. 
Firstly, what lessons can be drawn to better inform current policy on fostering an 
emergent farmer class? In addressing this, it is important to understand what characterises 
those farmers who have made the transition. They clearly all demonstrate an overarching 
desire to farm, evidenced even in a communal setting, for example, by prior engagement 
with petty commodity production and associated development of human capital. However, 
this in itself is clearly insuffcient. Regardless of their starting point, all the farmers 
we identify as making this transition have been able to rely on substantial fnancial or 
social capital, or more likely, combinations of both. It is this capacity, in conjunction with 
knowledge of commercial farming, which enables access to the physical and natural capital 
required to farm and in turn unlocks the economic potential of the land. However, it also 
important to emphasise that for many of these farmers their trajectory into commercial 
farming determines their subsequent vulnerability to short terms shocks and stresses. 
Importantly, it is the need of most small-scale commercial farmers to access fnancial capital 
that frames both their farming capacity and potential vulnerability. Arguably, many of 
these farmers are now in a more vulnerable position than either those who have remained 
as subsistence farmers on private farms and limited their exposure to fnancial risk, or 
those investor farmers who can buffer risk using capital from other businesses. If these 
small-scale commercial farmers are to succeed, it is therefore imperative that alternative, 
lower risk models of agricultural fnance aside from the open market, are embraced by 
government. Several, such as the Land Reform Fund [39] have been tabled but appear to 
be meeting with resistance. 
Secondly, agrarian policy must be refocused to also support the many existing land 
reform benefciaries who will likely not transition into commercial production, whether by 
default or desire. It is therefore vital that policy recognises the considerable differentiation 
that exists between emergent farmers [24] and tries to tailor support appropriately. On 
the one hand, this will require a greater focus on petty commodity producers of the 
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type identifed in this study, and how to better support them to sell and produce into 
formal, commercial markets. Here there is undoubtedly a role not just for government 
but also third sector organisations through, for example, livestock auctions [38,71,99]. On 
the other hand, it will also require a pragmatic approach to supporting many emergent 
farmers on private land to consolidate and derive resilient livelihoods from what are 
effectively subsistence modes of production, rather than encouraging them to adopt a more 
commercial focus. This will require a much broader policy focus for emergent farmers 
that places greater emphasis on livelihoods and minimising vulnerability. Critical to this 
will be a recognition of the multi-stranded nature of their subsistence livelihoods and 
how state support can most effectively dovetail with this. All of this fnds resonance with 
current debates regarding who should be targeted by agrarian reform; whether land reform 
should redistribute smaller pieces of land to those that are looking to engage in secure 
subsistence livelihoods; and the most appropriate approach to achieve this [1,18,39]. Much 
rests on the government’s willingness to rethink its alignment to the current neo-liberal 
land reform agenda and to begin to more effectively balance livelihood security with 
commercial production. 
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